


at stake — THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM





UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE

Printed by Twentieth Century Press (1912) Ltd., March, 1965



at stake—

The
CAUSE
of
FREEDOM

**The eleven years since the
Geneva accords on Vietnam**



Our goal is peace in South-East Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbours in peace.

What is at stake is the cause of freedom, and in that cause America will never be found wanting.

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
in his Inaugural Address
January 20, 1965

In the beginning . . .

The *Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam*, signed on July 20, 1954, by representatives of France and the Viet Minh, established a truce line at the 17th parallel, the Communists to withdraw to the north, the non-Communists and French to the south. Both sides were to order and enforce a complete end to hostilities, and neither zone was to be used as a military base to resume hostilities or further an aggressive policy. No new troops or military equipment were to be introduced except on a replacement or rotation basis. An International Control Commission (ICC) was created to supervise the truce.

The United States, although not a party to the agreement, attended the Geneva Conference as an observer and agreed to recognize and uphold the Conference accords. At that

time, the United States stated it would "view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

A separate declaration of the Conference stated that the truce line should not be considered permanent and called for nation-wide elections in two years under the supervision of the ICC.

The Communists assumed South Vietnam would quickly collapse and come under the domination of Hanoi. They rightly considered that the provision for elections would work in their favour since they possessed ironclad control over the more populous Northern zone and could insure that the people in the North would vote as directed.

In case the South neither collapsed nor fell to the North through elections, the Communists left thousands of arms and ammunition caches hidden in the South, along with large numbers of Viet Minh military personnel under orders to go underground until they were needed.

Complete independence from France did not come to South Vietnam until well after the Conference. The basic decision on the form and leadership of the new government was taken in a referendum on October 23, 1955. The country was declared a republic, and national elections were held on March 4, 1956, for a Constituent Assembly, which was transformed into a National Assembly after promulgation of the constitution it drafted.

By 1956 South Vietnam had thus established itself as a free republic determined to resist outside pressures and follow its own course. Government statements made between July 1954, when the Geneva accords were concluded, and July 1956, the date specified for the holding of elections, made it clear that South Vietnam did not regard itself obliged to take part in elections that were not free and would thus greatly favour the North. The inability of the ICC to enforce other parts of the Geneva accords showed that adequate conditions for free elections could not be assured in the North. Under such circumstances, South


Vietnam refused to agree to elections which could only result in its absorption into a totalitarian state.

Non-Communist nations are in general agreement that this absorption, either by an election weighted in favour of the North or through a Communist military victory, would have three major consequences:

1. Many Asians now on the fence would be convinced that Communism is the wave of the future. Free World support would be perceptibly devalued;

2. South Vietnam's rice surplus (about 350,000 metric tons) would solve one of the Communist North's most pressing problems: food. With this barrier to industrial expansion—and military adventures—removed, Vietnam might well become one of the most formidable members of the bloc. The performance of North Vietnam in Laos as well as in South Vietnam suggests that any strengthening of that regime is not likely to contribute to world peace;

3. The fall of South Vietnam would give the Communists a base extending through the middle of Asia to below the 10th degree of latitude. This would seriously increase the difficulty of defending the rest of South-East Asia and jeopardize the independent development of all free Asian nations.





This small town of Cai Be in South Vietnam was destroyed by the Communists with a mortar barrage that killed 24 children, 17 women and nine civil guardsmen. Another 40 men, women and children were wounded in the attack.

Broken pledges . . .

The years since 1954, when the Hanoi regime joined other nations in pledging an end to hostilities in South-East Asia, have been far from peaceful. There was an initial lull immediately after the agreements were signed. From 1954 to 1957 Communist activity in South Vietnam was generally confined to propaganda.


Then came the active infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnamese guerrillas. Some of them came by sea, in small boats. Others came across the border. And many followed the so-called Ho Chi-minh trail, a route which leads from North Vietnam through Communist held areas of neighbouring Laos, into South Vietnam. All of the subsequent fighting and terrorist actions have taken place south of the 17th parallel truce line set up by the Geneva accords.

Laos itself became the target of Communist activity, led by Prince Souphanouvong who was schooled by the party in

Hanoi. In another attempt to bring peace to South-East Asia, a 14-nation conference dealing only with Laos was convened in Geneva in 1962. Once again the Hanoi regime joined other nations in an agreement to guarantee peace in the area by pledging to withdraw all foreign troops in Laos. And once again the pledge was broken by Hanoi, which sent only a few troops through the checkpoint set up to oversee the withdrawal but left an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 behind.

The International Control Commission for Laos, set up to supervise the carrying out of the 1962 Geneva agreement, has been almost powerless to act. The Pathet Lao, as the Communists in Laos are known, have blocked inspection by attacking and destroying the ICC's helicopters and have attacked personnel working for the ICC.

In Vietnam, a similarly composed ICC group has also



Symbolic of the Communists' broken pledges is this bridge at Vinh Binh in the Republic of Vietnam, destroyed by the Viet Cong.

been powerless to supervise the 1954 agreement. ICC team members have been severely and continuously restricted by the Hanoi regime. Inspections of North Vietnam's major railroad line, for example, were permitted only once daily at times arbitrarily fixed by Communist officials. In mid-February of 1965 North Vietnam demanded the immediate withdrawal of all ICC inspection teams from its territory. The ICC issued a report on June 2, 1962, which said in part:

"Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the ICC (Legal) Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam . . ."

As South Vietnam recovered from the Indo-China war

and began to prosper, the Hanoi regime sent agents to assassinate South Vietnamese officials and agitate against the government. In further violation of the Geneva agreements, North Vietnamese infiltrators planted mines on highways and railroads, bombed schools and hospitals and attacked members of the civilian population.

Captured North Vietnamese officers have publicly stated that they and hundreds of armed soldiers under their command had infiltrated South Vietnamese territory to assist the Viet Cong guerrillas. It is estimated that a minimum of 4,000 men infiltrated from the North in the first seven months of 1964, and as many as 10,000 may have come during the entire year. The Communist Viet Cong already had tens of thousands of both hard-core and part-time guerrillas operating in South Vietnam.

Early in 1965 the ICC received the latest in a series of notes from the South Vietnamese government listing in detail foreign made weapons captured from the guerrillas fighting in the South. These amounted to 800 weapons ranging from rifles to recoilless cannons. They bore markings showing they were manufactured in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Communist China and East Germany.

A call for help . . .

The Communists of North Vietnam and China are eager to take over the fertile area of South-East Asia, not by the type of open aggression used in Korea but by attack from within, by covert aggression through guerrilla warfare, and by infiltrating trained men and armed men across national frontiers. Communist success in Laos and South Vietnam would gravely threaten the freedom and independence of the rest of South-East Asia. It would undermine the neutrality of Cambodia, would make Thailand's position practically untenable, would increase the already great pressure on Burma, would place India in jeopardy of being outflanked, would enlarge Communist influence and pressures on Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and would impair the Free World defence position in all of Asia. It would confirm the Asian Communist belief that a policy of militancy pays dividends, and could undermine the will of free peoples on other continents to defend themselves.

It was for these reasons that the United States, and other free nations, responded when South Vietnam sent out a call for help in resisting aggression from the North.

Even before the aggression began in earnest, South

Vietnam faced staggering problems—to name only one: the 900,000 refugees who, at the time of partition, had fled homes in the North to escape Communist rule—but tangible signs of progress soon were evident in education, rice production, transportation, land reform, rubber output, and industrial development.

This confounded the expectations of the Communists in Hanoi, who had expected South Vietnam to collapse and fall under their control. In 1957 they began the attempt to bring about the collapse of the South through selective terrorism and sabotage. In 1959 Hanoi announced its campaign of “national liberation”—the term Communists use to describe armed Communist revolt against legally constituted governments.

Recently, Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that in 1959 “no foreign nation had bases or fighting forces in South Vietnam. South Vietnam was not a member of any alliance. If it was a threat to North Vietnam it was because its economy far outshone the vaunted ‘Communist Paradise’ to the north.”

. . . supported by three U.S. Presidents



"Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in South-East Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement . . . The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom."

—President Eisenhower



"The systematic aggression now bleeding South Vietnam is not a 'war of liberation,' for Vietnam is already free. It is a war of attempted subjugation, and it will be resisted."

"Our object is to permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and independent country and permit democratic forces within the country to operate."

—President Kennedy



"It may be helpful to outline four basic themes that govern our policy in South-East Asia."


"First, America keeps her word."

"Second, the issue is the future of South-East Asia as a whole."

"Third, our purpose is peace."

"Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity."

—President Johnson



This block of TNT, labelled in the Chinese language and obviously of Chinese Communist manufacture, was supplied by North Vietnam to Communist Viet Cong guerrillas.

The number and arsenal marks on the breech of a captured 75mm. recoilless rifle show that the weapon was manufactured in Red China.




Seven years ago, when the Viet Cong began to step up their effort to destroy orderly government in South Vietnam, their weaponry was relatively simple. They relied upon weapons which had been buried in the South before the 1954 Geneva accords, arms which they captured from Government forces, and crude weapons which the Viet Cong made in secret workshops.

Late in 1963, however, North Vietnam began sending a large volume of weapons which had never been seen in South Vietnam before—arms of Communist-bloc design, most of them manufactured in Communist China.

Then, in February 1965 the magnitude and significance of North Vietnam's support to the Viet Cong were demonstrated clearly by an arms dump found at Vung Ro in South Vietnam. Inescapable evidence—markings, documents, the types of weapons themselves, and a ship sunk there while carrying arms—shows that these arms were sent by sea from North Vietnam.

South Vietnamese Rangers found at least 3,000 rifles. Cases held an estimated one million rounds of small arms ammunition—much of it for the latest Communist-bloc


These captured Type 53 carbines, a copy of the Soviet M1944 Mosin-Nagant carbine, were made in Communist China and shipped to Communist Viet Cong guerrillas.




weapons. There were anti-tank rockets of Soviet design, ammunition for 75-millimetre recoilless rifles, Bangalore torpedoes, grenades and explosives—packed in their original cases and marked with the abbreviated Chinese characters used only in Communist China. Wooden-handled grenades, of the type used by the Chinese Communists during the Korean war, bore Chinese Communist arsenal markings and dates as late as May 1964.

Documents found on the sunken ship included a newspaper from the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong, dated January 23, 1965, and part of the records of a regular North Vietnamese signals unit.

Close-ups showing Chinese language inscriptions on 75mm. recoilless rifle shells captured by South Vietnam soldiers while fighting the Viet Cong.



Two Bangalore torpedoes (right) and container, manufactured in Communist China and delivered to Communist North Vietnam, which then supplied them to the Viet Cong, are among thousands of Chinese military weapons captured by South Vietnam troops.



United Nations informed . . .

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Chief U.S. Representative at the United Nations, in discussing the Gulf of Tonkin attacks on American naval units by the North Vietnamese in 1964, told the Security Council:

“The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as a part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnapping of village officials in the Republic of South Vietnam makes no sense either. Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse, or the sabotage of an irrigation project, or the murder of a medical worker, or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

“All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in South-East Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Vietnam by the regimes in Hanoi

and Peking. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos, and all the acts of subversion, and all the propaganda, and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements, and the deliberate, systematic, and flagrant violations of those agreements by two regimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice are bound by their provisions.

“The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectacular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night. But they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of South-East Asia to an empire ruled by means of force of arms, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence.

“We hoped that the peace settlement in 1954 would lead

to peace in Vietnam. We hoped that that settlement, and the supplementary Geneva accords of 1962, would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried aggression before, and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew.

"In South-East Asia, we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independence of the peoples of the area. We are in South-East Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, alien assassination, managed by the North Vietnam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peking.

"Two months ago, when we were discussing in this Council the problems created on the Cambodia-South Vietnam frontier by the Communist Viet Cong, I defined our peace aims in South-East Asia. I repeat them today:

" 'There is a very easy way to restore order in South-East Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of the United States military aid to the Republic of Vietnam.

" 'Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to

leave their neighbours alone; stop the secret subversion of other people's independence; stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers; stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence; stop the violations of the political agreement reached at Geneva for the future of South-East Asia.

" 'The people of Laos want to be left alone. The people of Vietnam want to be left alone. The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

" 'When their neighbours decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in South-East Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these peoples resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforceable terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence.'

"When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference tables in Geneva are endorsed, the independence of South-East Asia will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to South-East Asia and military power can be withdrawn."

What the Communists say . . .

The Communist regime of North Vietnam, by 1964, was reporting its direct involvement in the Viet Cong guerrilla warfare being waged against South Vietnam. Communist China also proclaimed its support of the Viet Cong after supplying them with weapons and ammunition for years in secret.

"It is the sacred duty of the North Vietnamese people" to support the fight of the Communist-led Viet Cong, declared President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam on May 7 (1964).

The chief editor of *Hoc Tap*, principal theoretical journal of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, wrote in July that North Vietnam's role was vital to the Viet Cong operations.

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), organized and directed by Hanoi, claims to represent "patriotic" elements in South Vietnam but actually serves as a propaganda and liaison arm for the North Vietnam Communists, as well as for the Viet Cong.

In a statement broadcast by Radio Peking on July 18 an NFLSVN delegate thanked the Chinese Communists for their support of the South Vietnamese Communists.

On August 4, another NFLSVN representative was quoted by Radio Peking:

"On behalf of the NFLSVN in South Vietnam, I once again express the most sincere thanks to Chairman Mao, the Chinese Government, the various people's organizations and the Chinese people for their consistent and all-out support . . ."

In Communist propaganda terminology, the Hanoi-Viet Cong aggression against South Vietnam is described as "revolution" instead of warfare, a point that should be kept in mind if the actual meaning of Communist statements is to be understood.

Thus, as far back as December of 1960, the Communist Party of North Vietnam specified that its main job was "to carry out the socialist [Communist] revolution in the North

and simultaneously to carry out the national [Communist] revolution in the South.”

Following are other typical Communist statements:

— *Hoc Tap*, February 1963: “The South Vietnam revolution is leaning on a firm rear area, namely North Vietnam, the common base of the revolution of the entire country.”

— *Hoc Tap*, March 1963: “. . . North Vietnam is the firm base for the Southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution.”

— *Hoc Tap*, December 1963: “The revolutionary struggle of Southern compatriots . . . is fully and wholeheartedly supported by Northern compatriots. North Vietnam has become a sound basis for the revolution throughout the country.”

— *Hoc Tap*, January 1964: “The content and significance of our active support . . . must be shown in our determination to . . . support morally and materially the South Vietnamese revolution . . .

“Placing absolute confidence in the leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, headed by President Ho, (we) will struggle (toward) . . . constructing socialism [Communism] in the North and completing the revolution in the South.”

— *Hoc Tap*, February 1964: “The line of the Vietnamese revolution, as fixed by our party, is correct . . . our party considers the common task of the Vietnamese revolution to be to carry out the socialist [Communist] revolution in the North, and simultaneously, to carry out the revolution in the South . . .”

— *Hoc Tap*, February 1964: “Applying the experiences of the struggle . . . under the leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party and Government, the NFLSVN is leading all the Southern people in carrying out the struggle . . .”

— Radio Hanoi, April 28, 1964: “. . . strive to build and defend the North, and actively support the patriotic struggle of our compatriots in the South.”

— *Hoc Tap*, July 1964: “. . . positively support the revolution of the Southern compatriots.”

— Radio Hanoi, July 5, 1964: “The National Assembly of the Government wholeheartedly supports the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.”

— *Hoc Tap*, July 1964: “The North and South each has a revolutionary task, but the two strategic tasks of the two parts are the common tasks of the Vietnamese revolution.”

— *Nhan Dan* (Communist Party newspaper published in Hanoi) August 10, 1964: “The . . . forces (in South Vietnam) deem it their responsibility to increase attacks upon, annihilate, and punish the enemy on all battlefields.”



Australian airmen arrive at Saigon with the first three of six Caribou aircraft of the RAAF.

Japanese aid includes a medical team and equipment, 25 ambulances and 20,000 radio receivers.



New Zealand army engineers work with Vietnamese to repair a bridge north of Saigon.

The Philippines has sent civic action officers, medical doctors and nurses.



A 25-nation effort . . .

During the last 10 years, funds, medical personnel, non-combat troops or materials have been sent or pledged by some 25 nations.

In 1964 a number of countries announced that they were increasing their assistance to South Vietnam, and in February of 1965, Korea sent 2,000 non-combat troops. The troops consist of engineering and transportation units. Their primary task will be to help reconstruction work in Vietnam. A Korean mobile surgical hospital unit with 130 medical personnel has been in Vietnam for some time.

The United States has already contributed some \$2,000 million in economic aid alone, as well as military advisers and equipment requested by the South Vietnamese Government.

Much of the aid from abroad is used to improve the lot of civilians in Vietnam: education, economic development, and medical care. No brief inventory of foreign aid to South Vietnam can pretend to be all-inclusive, but a recent survey would include these contributions from the following:

Great Britain—Long-term assistance in village defence and educational projects, including a sizeable recent cash contribution and funds for building secondary roads in rural areas.

France—Financial aid to conduct economic, technical and cultural assistance projects; export credit, industrial equipment, maintenance of a hospital and schools.

Federal Republic of Germany—Financial assistance for a chemical plant and imports; also credits for economic development undertakings.

Japan—Financial aid for hydro-electric development, import financing, medical and other aid.

Thailand—Aid to rural development programmes and assistance in the training of jet pilots.

Australia—A group of Royal Air Force pilots and mechanics to operate and service planes; military advisers, vehicles, supplies and equipment; agricultural experts.

Republic of China—500,000 textbooks, agricultural supplies, equipment, economic and technical personnel, aluminium warehouses.

Iran—1,000 tons of petroleum products.

Canada—Educational funds and facilities.

Malaysia—Personnel to instruct in defence against guerrilla attacks; military vehicles.

New Zealand—Army engineers to build roads and bridges, surgical teams, teachers, medical equipment, and funds.

Philippines—Surgical teams; technical advisers.

Switzerland—Precision microscopes for Saigon University.

The Netherlands—Agriculture experts.

Italy—Surgical team.

Other pledges of aid have also been made by Austria, Brazil, India, Israel, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Greece.

U.S. policy in South-East Asia

by William P. Bundy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

The Geneva Conference agreements of 1954 brought new hopes of peace to South-East Asia. After years of intermittent warfare in the area, the way was prepared for free and independent national states to seek their own solutions to the eternal problems of building political and economic structures that would satisfy their people's aspirations.

The United States cared about South-East Asia then, and we care today, because we know that what happens there will help determine whether we are to have the kind of world in which the common ideals of freedom can spread and nations can live and work together without strife. Our basic stake in South-East Asia is our stake in a peaceful and secure world as distinct from a violent and chaotic one.

However, the Geneva accords left a situation with many seeds of future trouble:

North Vietnam was militantly Communist, and had developed during the war an army well-equipped and

highly skilled in both conventional and subversive warfare. From the start, North Vietnam planned and expected to take over the South and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking that this would probably happen by sheer decay under pressure, but prepared to resort to other means.

South Vietnam had no effective or popular leadership to start with, was demoralised and unprepared for self-government, and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese military forces which had fought against the Communists.

Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in food, South Vietnam had few assets that appeared to match those of the North in the struggle that was sure to come.

Laos was less unified and was left under the Geneva accords with a built-in and legalised Communist presence, a disrupted and weak economy, and no military forces of significance.

Such was the situation in 1954. Two things were clear—

that in the absence of external help, Communism was virtually certain to take over the successor states of Indo-China and move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that no power other than the United States could move in to help fill the vacuum.

The U.S. decision was to move in to help these countries. Besides South Vietnam and more modest efforts in Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun in Thailand.

Appropriations to support these actions were voted by successive U.S. Congresses, and in 1954 the U.S. Senate likewise ratified the South-East Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the Philippines adhered, along with Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. Although not signers of the treaty, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could call on the SEATO members for help against aggression.

So a commitment was made that has guided our policy in South-East Asia for a decade now.

It was not a commitment that envisaged a United States position of power in South-East Asia or U.S. military bases there. We threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment that substituted U.S. responsibility for the basic responsibility of the nations themselves for their own defence, political stability, and economic progress.

It was a commitment to do what we could to help those nations attain and maintain the independence and security to which they were entitled—both for their sake and because we recognized that, like South Korea, South-

East Asia was a key area of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this would enormously add to the momentum and power of the expansionist Communist regimes in Communist China and North Vietnam, and thus to the threat to the whole Free World position in the Pacific.

Our objectives in Asia are those of the free nations of the area—that they should develop as they see fit, in peace and without outside interference. We would hope that this development will be in the direction of increasingly democratic institutions, and that there will be continued and expanded ties of partnership and contact with ourselves and with the other nations of the Free World.

Asia confronts two central problems: the threat of Communist nations whose objective is domination and enslavement, and enormous economic and political problems.

To deal with these central problems, the free nations of the area need the help of the United States and of our major allies. The free nations of Asia cannot do the job alone. We cannot do it for them, but we have the resources and the military power to play a crucial role.

The peace and security of East and South-East Asia are indivisible. If the Communist powers succeed in aggression, they will be encouraged, free nations discouraged, and the inevitable process of evolution toward moderation within the Communist countries themselves postponed or perhaps prevented altogether.

A victory for the Communists in South Vietnam would

inevitably make the neighbouring states more susceptible to Communist pressure and more vulnerable to intensified subversion supported by military pressures. Aggression by "wars of national liberation" would gain enhanced prestige and powers of intimidation throughout the world, and many threatened nations might well become less hopeful, less resilient, and their will to resist would become undermined.

Let us go back to South Vietnam in 1954 and trace the course of events to the present.

From 1954 to 1959, great progress was made. The nationalist feeling of the newly-formed country was aroused. It soon became and has remained clear that the great mass of the people of South Vietnam do not wish to be ruled by Communism or from Hanoi.

On the economic and social front, education was vastly expanded, major land reforms carried out, and the economy grew at a rapid rate, far outstripping what was happening under the Communist yoke in the North.

Then, beginning roughly in 1959, Hanoi went on the march.

Seeing itself dwarfed in both South Vietnam and Laos, Hanoi began to send trained guerrillas into the South and increasing the cadres assigned to assist the Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos.

As early as 1957, a campaign of assassination of local officials had begun. In 1959, such activity was stepped up, guerrilla units formed, and the real campaign got under way.

Thousands of highly trained men coming from the North, along with crucial items of equipment and munitions—these have been from the start the mainspring of the Viet Cong insurgency. This has been all along a Communist subversive aggression, in total violation of the Geneva accords as well as general principles of international behaviour.

By early 1961, South Vietnam was clearly in difficulty. President Johnson, then Vice-President, visited the country in the spring. We stepped up our military supplies and tried to turn our training emphasis increasingly to the guerrilla front. Then, in the autumn of 1961, a series of key assassinations and raids on governments centres by the Communists brought South Vietnamese morale to a critical point.

President Kennedy responded to the request of the South Vietnamese Government for American military advisors with Vietnamese units, and for Americans to furnish helicopter and air transport lift, combat air training, communications, and every possible form of aid short of combat units.

Under the advisory concept, the American strength in South Vietnam rose to 12,000 by mid-1962 and to 23,000 by February of 1965.

It is a tough war and the Vietnamese are a tough people to have stood up under it and to be holding their heads above water after 20 years of violence and uncertainty. As long as South Vietnam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable.

A Chronology . . .

1954

May 8-July 21—Geneva Conference on Indo-China agrees on a truce line along the 17th parallel in Vietnam; an International Control Commission (ICC) composed of Canada, India and Poland is set up to supervise implementation of the agreements.

1955

February 12—The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) takes over the training of the South Vietnamese army at Vietnam's request.

April 17—South Vietnamese Government appeals to the United Nations against the North Vietnamese Communists, who, in violation of the Geneva agreements, prevent Northerners from migrating to South Vietnam.

July—Communists initiate first overt propaganda move in South Vietnam by distributing literature signed by North Vietnam's "National United Front."

1956

April 6—South Vietnam Government announces it will continue to co-operate with the ICC.

1957

October 22—Bombing of U.S. installations in Saigon.

1958

January 4—Large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantations north of Saigon.

1959

July 8—Communist guerrillas attack Vietnamese military base at Bien Hoa.

1960

June-October—Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam increase.

October 26—President Eisenhower assures Republic of Vietnam on its fifth anniversary that the United States "will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

November 10—South Vietnam charges, in letter to ICC, that Communist attacks in October in the Kontum-Pleiku area: (1) involved regular army forces from Communist North Vietnam through Laos, (2) constituted open aggression which was well prepared, commanded by high-ranking officers, and conducted by regular forces trained in North Vietnam, and (3) employed weapons made in North Vietnam and other Communist countries.

1961

January 29—Radio Hanoi praises establishment of the "National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam." Its "sacred historical task," according to January 30 Radio Hanoi broadcast, is "to liberate the South."

March 10—Communists announce a guerrilla offensive will be started to prevent holding April 9 elections.

April 4—South Vietnam appeals to ICC to make an "immediate and energetic investigation of growing Communist terrorism and subversion throughout South Vietnam."

September 4—Army command communique states that in August there were 41 engagements between Government forces and Communist rebels in South Vietnam.

September 18—Communist forces estimated at 1,500 men attack and seize the capital of Phuoc Thanh Province, 60 miles from Saigon.

1962

June 2—Canadian and Indian members of the ICC find North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression against South Vietnam.

December 6—South Vietnamese Government protests to the ICC against introduction of Chinese Communist-made weapons and ammunition; a large cache was discovered in the Central Highlands.

1963

December 14—U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports on stepped up guerrilla attacks on hamlets, outposts and patrols in November, estimating Government casualties at 2,800 and Viet Cong losses at 2,900.

1964

January 2—Secretary Rusk announces that a Vietnamese army group seized in the Delta area of Vietnam "some 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in (Communist) China" and that almost certainly Hanoi was primarily responsible for their infiltration into South Vietnam.

August 2—Destroyer *USS Maddox* is attacked in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

August 4—Destroyers *C. Turner Joy* and *Maddox* are attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats.

August 4—President Johnson orders U.S. air action against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam.

August 5—President Johnson sends message to Congress. Joint resolution is introduced in Congress "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in South-East Asia.

August 7—Congress approves the Resolution. (Senate vote 88-2; House 416-0).

1965

January 4—In State of the Union Message, President Johnson said of Vietnam:

"In Asia, Communism wears a more aggressive face.

"We see that in Vietnam.

"Why are we there?

"We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against Communist aggression. Ten years ago we pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it.

"Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression would only increase the danger of a larger war."

February 14—North Vietnam announces that it had asked for withdrawal of observer teams of International Control Commission posted on its border with Communist China and at other points within the country.

February 25—Secretary of State Dean Rusk declares that the U.S. had told Communist China there would be no basis for negotiations in Vietnam until Hanoi ceased its aggression.

February 27—U.S. State Department issues 64-page White Paper documenting "Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam."

Summing up . . .

On February 27, 1965, the U.S. State Department issued a 64-page report summarizing the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Vietnam.

This evidence, jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts, shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the military high command in Hanoi.

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi. Communist China and other Communist states have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition and they have been primarily channeled through North Vietnam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Vietnam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North

Vietnam has intensified its aggression in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Vietnam is a party. It shatters the peace of South-East Asia. It is a fundamental threat to the freedom and security of South Vietnam.

In concluding its report on "Aggression from the North: the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam," the State Department emphasized these points:

"The people of South Vietnam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

"The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favoured position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the post-war world, and we have met it.

"If peace can be restored in South Vietnam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make."

