

General **Van Tien Dung**

V.P.A. Chief of General Staff

South Vietnam

**U.S. defeat
inevitable**

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U. S. D E F E A T
I N E V I T A B L E

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

An expeditionary force more than 440,000 strong and nearly 100,000 troops from U.S. satellite countries have been brought into South Vietnam to fight together with over 500,000 puppet troops in execution of the adventurous plans of the Washington strategists.

According to United States responsible officials' public declarations, in the near future this tremendous build-up will be substantially strengthened, and perfidious and barbaric schemes put into effect.

Meanwhile, the American propaganda machine has unleashed a noisy campaign about successes won by U.S. expeditionary troops. What is the true picture of the situation and the results of the United States war efforts?

In this booklet, General Van Tien Dung, Chief of the Vietnam People's Army General Staff, gives an answer to this question and, with bare facts, shows the inevitable fate of the aggressor in South Vietnam.

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U. S. DEFEAT INEVITABLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The die being cast, the American imperialists, defeated in their "special warfare", recklessly and frenziedly unleashed a "limited war" against South Vietnam and a war of destruction against North Vietnam. They introduced into the Vietnam battlefield huge forces in an attempt to turn the tide of the situation in their favour. In 1966 alone, they despatched 210,000 G.I.'s, bringing their expeditionary troops to 400,000 men, not counting those of the Seventh Fleet and in the bases in Thailand and other places. Thus, the U.S. forces engaged in direct combat in Vietnam have risen to more than half a million, while the total number of American, puppet and satellite troops has exceeded one million. Of the means of war, many have doubled or trebled and more. According to the French *Revue de Défense nationale*, the United States has used directly or indirectly for its aggressive war against Vietnam 75 per cent of its ground forces, 60 per cent of its air force and 40 per cent of its naval forces, drawn from the most seasoned units. To cite American official figures — usually curtailed — it spent for this war 25 billion dollars in 1966 and is planning to put in from five to seven billion more in 1967.

The United States aggressive war in South Vietnam, with its present scale, has surpassed the one it waged against Korea (1950-1953) in all respects. It outdoes any previous war in the intensity of bombs, bullets and modern weapons used, in fierceness and barbarity. It can be said that in the world history of war, never before has any aggressor thrown into a small and narrow battlefield like our country such a large number of troops, such a big amount of weapons, bombs, bullets, money and other material resources.

But, what a shame for the U.S. aggressors! Bumping against the nation-wide, all-sided war of resistance of the heroic people of Vietnam they have suffered and are sustaining ignominious setbacks.

Taking avail of their winning position and maintaining the initiative of operations, in the test of strength with the U.S. expeditionary force, our people in both zones have achieved great successes. They have won the first round of the American imperialists' "limited war" in South Vietnam, frustrated their air war of destruction in North Vietnam in regard to its main goals, consolidated and strengthened our people's forces in every field, and prepared all material and moral conditions to bring our resistance against U.S. aggression for national salvation to complete victory.

In South Vietnam, in particular, under the banner of the National Front for Liberation, our people's war against the U.S. "limited war" has scored far-reaching and glorious successes, both in the military and in the political fields, first of all, in the military field.

We shall deal below with the military successes that the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have registered in the recent past.

PART I

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES' AND PEOPLE'S BIG SUCCESSES, AMERICAN AND PUPPET HEAVY SETBACKS

I. — Unremittingly shattering U.S. strategic plans, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people continue maintaining and promoting their initiative, strength and winning position, thereby aggravating U.S.-puppet loss of initiative, weaknesses and setbacks.

When the Americans embarked on a "limited war" of aggression, their policy was to strengthen the U.S. expeditionary corps rapidly and uninterruptedly, to use U.S. and puppet troops as strategic forces with the former as the mainstay, and to carry out their counter-offensive strategy with a view to checking the wave of offensive of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, wiping out regular L.A.F. units, regaining the initiative, turning the military tide and changing defeat into victory.

After the emergency despatch of G.I.'s to South Vietnam in mid 1965—when the "special warfare" strategy

had proved a failure — and the subsequent continuous flow of reinforcements, the U.S. command launched the first dry-season strategic counter-offensive (1965-1966) with 200,000 American, 30,000 satellite and 500,000 Saigon troops. With such a rather big force and great ambitions, they, however, sustained a bitter failure. In the momentum of their victory over the “special warfare” strategy, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people carried on their irresistible offensive, hitting hard at the G.I.’s and bringing to nought the first U.S. strategic counter-offensive.

Significance and characteristics of the South Vietnamese armed forces’ and people’s successes and the enemy’s failures :

— It was a major warning blow dealt at the U.S. expeditionary force which, over-confident in their numerical superiority, strong firepower and great mobility, showed much truculence in its first engagements.

— The Americans were unable to achieve their strategic objectives, more particularly that aiming at “searching” out the Vietcong to “break their backbone”. To their utter surprise, instead of wiping out any single L.A.F. unit, they received blow after blow and lost whole companies, battalions and even task forces.

— U.S. setbacks and our successes were both military and political, but essentially military. The capacity of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people to defeat the aggressor on the battlefield had proved a reality in the first trial of strength between people’s war and the U.S. “limited war” of aggression.

The fiasco of their first counter-offensive strategy had driven the U.S.-puppet troops into a tighter corner in terms of morale, effectives, structures and *matériel*. Hence, at the beginning of the 1966 rainy season, the U.S.-puppet command was, from the strategical point of view, *temporarily forced back into utter defensive*. While preparing for a new strategic counter-offensive plan, it replenished troops and strengthened its build-up which finally ran to 300,000 American, 40,000 satellite and 500,000 puppet troops. But, giving the enemy no respite, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people attacked him without let-up whatever the season, thoroughly upset their plans and won successive victories.

The remarkable successes of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people during this rainy season were unpleasant surprises for the Americans and the puppets.

— The rapid growth of the armed forces and people in Quangtri and Thuathien provinces opened a new battlefield which upset the U.S. strategic battle-array in the South Vietnamese theatre and caused the U.S. command to hurriedly send troops there to cope with the situation in an utmost quandary.

— Guerilla warfare in the plains, from Quangtri and Thuathien to Central Trungbo and Nambo, made new headway, expanding evenly in all areas.

— After the serious political crisis resulting from the massive despatch of G.I.'s and the failure of the first U.S. strategic counter-offensive, the urban movement flared up again, particularly in the provinces of the Ist Tactical Zone. Developing in both the military

and political fields, it strongly hit enemy bases, depots and leading bodies.

— The South Vietnamese armed forces and people won resounding victories on land and river communications (Highways Nos 13, 15, 1, 20 and 4, the Longtau River, the Dongnai River, etc).

To face such a situation, the U.S.-puppet command had to scatter its troops more thinly than before, from Quangtri and Thuathien to Camau. The enemy was threatened everywhere, continually lacking troops in spite of reinforcements.

Such a situation paved the way for a bigger and all-sided U.S. puppet failure of the following strategic counter-offensive plan. Indeed, despite the commitment of about 1,000,000 troops — 400,000 American, 50,000 satellite, over 500,000 puppet troops — *the second strategic counter-offensive during the 1966-1967 dry season* was devoid of the fierceness which had marked the first counter-offensive. The Americans showed "caution" in strategic direction, operations and combat, in "search and destroy" actions as well as in "pacification" work. Formerly, Westmoreland had been able to launch a five-pronged "general counter-offensive" with only 40,000 troops in the South Vietnamese theatre. Now, in Tayninh alone, he had to mount three successive large-scale operations (Operation *Junction City* in February 1967 involved 45,000 men) to arrive at the conclusion that they were "disappointing". General Jonathan Seaman commanding Operation *Junction City* was dismissed. The fate of the second strategic counter-offensive had been sealed.

The big military successes of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people were characterized by the following features :

— Growing ever more vigorously, the L.A.F. held the initiative. They compelled a numerically superior enemy to spread his forces thin. They wiped him out not only in the plains but also in the forest and mountains. They foiled his offensives aimed at “searching and destroying” L.A.F. units and smashing its rear areas (Tayninh, Pleijrang). They put out of action an important part of his troops — mainly American — bringing the large-scale combat tactics to a new degree of development, combining big-unit actions with guerilla warfare to knock down their opponent and defend their own bases.

— The South Vietnamese armed forces and people launched offensives and counter-offensives. They fought off terrorist raids, nibbling and “pacification” operations in the plains, especially in the Central Trungbo plains and the Mekong delta, wiped out many U.S. and puppet battalions. They closely combined the annihilation of enemy forces with the defence of the people, firmly held their initiative and extended the liberated zones.

— The L.A.F. infiltrated deep into the enemy's rear, using various people's war tactics. They attacked his bases, communications and occupied towns (Saigon, Hue, Bienhoa, Tansonnhat, Longbinh, Pleiku, Danang, Tamky, on the Longtau River, etc). They combined strikes against structures and *matériel* with the destruction of forces, rear attacks with front attacks.

— The development and results of the recent fierce trial of strength show that *the strategic offensive position of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people is growing stronger. They are continuing to promote their initiative, strength and winning position. The enemy keeps obstinately augmenting his effectives but his position of strategic counter-offensive ceaselessly deteriorates and is becoming an ever-weaker, more defensive and losing one.*

Despite U.S. increasing build-up, the military offensive strategy of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, based on growing military and political forces, and carried out with initiative and from a strong and winning position, is powerfully developing in accordance with the law of people's war:

— Involving small operations at the outset, it permits now to mount big ones and to combine these two forms of action ever more closely.

— From few-sided it becomes many-sided and more and more comprehensive.

— From some theatres at the beginning, it now embraced the whole of South Vietnam, the mountains, the plains, and the towns from Nambo, Central Trungbo, to Quangtri and Thuathien provinces up north.

— From a few initial tactics the L.A.F. have devised largely varied ones which are closely combined in each operation, in each and all theatres.

— The L.A.F. military offensive strategy has generated an ever-stronger wave of onslaughts and an ever-firmer strategic position resulting in more frequent

successes, one paving the way for another larger in scale.

— This military offensive strategy is more and more tightly combined with, and effectively assist, political actions and agitation work among enemy troops.

To put into effect their counter-offensive strategy, the enemy keeps increasing their troops and carried out different strategic plans. They dispose of big effectives and show great stubbornness, but their counter-attacks unfold from a losing position of passivity and weakness, in the condition of a more unfavourable relation of forces. This explains why, contrary to their desire, they have to act on the defensive and parry the blows of their adversary. Their counter-attacks are marked by a passive character and elements of a defensive nature are on the increase in their counter-offensive strategy. In their general strategy, they try to counter-attack, but in their strategic direction, on a battlefield and in a given period, they are reduced to the defensive. The trend toward the defensive is growingly patent in their counter-offensive strategy. No wonder that their attacks and counter-attacks are checked by the L.A.F.'s uninterrupted blows, that they get battered when and where they fall back to the defensive. To their great surprise, their strategic position, far from improving with the increase of their troops, goes from bad to worse and their counter-offensive force does not become stronger.

Taking the war as a whole as well as from a strictly military point of view, the L.A.F.'s initiative, increasingly strong and winning position are their fundamental

fortes whereas the enemy's loss of initiative, weaknesses and setbacks constitute his fundamental foibles. This is a factor that guarantees that the South Vietnamese armed forces and people will frustrate all subsequent U.S. strategic plans and achieve ever-bigger military successes however great the U.S. build-up.

II. — Wiping out a great part of enemy troops, destroying a large quantity of enemy war means and foiling every U.S. tactics the L.A.F. and people in South Vietnam keep stepping up the building of armed forces and creatively developing original people's war fighting methods.

In their strategic counter-offensive plans, with a view to wiping out regular Liberation troops and destroying revolutionary base areas, the American aggressors have mobilized big mobile forces and launched a series of "search and destroy" operations against key areas in the South Vietnamese theatre. Mobile forces from "famed" U.S. units have played the part of shock troops in relatively large deployments in tens of battles at full division strength or more directed against areas they supposed to be L.A.F. bases in the mountains or in the plains. There have also been hundreds of "sweeps" involving one or several battalions or regiments. The enemy used every up-to-date technique and war means, dropped thousands of tons of bombs, fired hundreds of thousands of shells, had recourse to all tactics, including heliborne, armourborne and B.52 tactics, great mobility, encirclement tactics and co-ordinated operations. All this put such a finish-look on the U.S. plans.

With a determination of a strategic character, in their attacks and counter-attacks, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people concentrated all their strength on the fight, resolute to foil all U.S.-puppet dry-season counter-offensive and rainy-season dig-in defensive plans. Holding the initiative, L.A.F. units intercepted and checked adverse counter-offensives in every theatre, from Eastern Nambo to the High Plateau of Taynguyen and the plains of Central Trungbo, achieved resounding exploits with telling blows at Baubang, Longnguyen, Nhado, Xuan-son. They lured the enemy out to fight them at, among other places, Pleime, Donggiap, Tayninh, Pleijrang, West Sontinh, Highway No 9. They made deep thrusts into his lairs, unremittingly striking at urban centres, airbases, harbours, depots and increased their activities in guerilla belts, against land and river communications, constantly maintaining him in their many-rowed redoubtable battle-array.

The L.A.F. skilfully opposed their strong points to the weak points of the Americans, breaking the U.S.-puppet counter-offensive and defence lines with the magnificently combined battle-array of people's war.

The development of the operations and battles fell short of the subjective and erroneous calculations of the U.S.-puppet command. Hoping to wipe out the L.A.F. regular forces, *they, in fact, lost a large and important part of military manpower.* American casualties (1) and puppet troops' disintegration (2) were proportionate to the U.S. build-up.

(1) In 1966 alone, the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces and people put out of action 370,000 enemy troops,
...

On the battlefield, every U.S. tactics—"search and destroy", rescue, "sweeps" to ensure security and defence—as well as U.S. tactical, technical and organizational innovations were successively checked and fizzled out. U.S. tactics caught in a vicious circle of faulty strategy were in the throes of a serious crisis and their failures increased with each lesson of experience.

The heavy losses in combat manpower and war means, and the fiasco of U. S. operational and tactical plans eloquently prove that the U. S. "search and destroy" objective, that is, the breaking of the L.A.F. regular forces which forms the cornerstone of the U.S. military strategy, has been frustrated.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam have become stronger than ever and, very noteworthy, the L.A.F. have made big strides. The people and the three kinds of armed forces have grown up in the crucible of fire and acquired abundant combat experiences. The regular, regional and guerilla forces have increased in numbers—and more important—in combativity; they have developed harmoniously and have been fielded in a fairly rational way. On this basis, the three kinds of armed forces have been able

among them 180,000 Americans and nearly 10,000 satellite troops. This figure included 17 infantry battalions, 7 armoured battalions and 79 companies of U.S. troops. They shot down or destroyed 2,100 aircraft, of various types and demolished 3,300 military vehicles, including 1,200 armoured troop carriers.

(2) In 1966, 100,000 puppet troops deserted, not counting those wiped out.

to co-ordinate effectively, closely combine guerilla warfare with large-unit actions, co-ordinate operations in various theatres in order to maintain and promote uninterruptedly their offensive position.

While U.S. brass hats boasted that "their military situation had improved" and that they had forced the L.A.F. "to disperse and fall back to guerilla warfare", the latter, on the basis of the vigorous expansion of guerilla activities, kept fielding larger and larger units. The L.A.F. annihilation tactics have made pretty rapid progress: at first, the L.A.F. could wipe out one U.S. company-size unit at a time, after a few months they have been able to destroy one or several U.S. battalion-size units, infantry and armoured units alike, along with their war *matériel*.

In their decisive test of strength, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have never ceased improving in an creative way their tactics so as to make them more effective, raising them to the level of an original, comprehensive fighting art of people's war in Vietnam: armed struggle combined with political struggle, three-pronged offensive—armed struggle, political struggle, agitation work among enemy troops—co-ordinated combat tactics. All this has enabled the Liberation regular troops to strike hard blows on the battlefield in a very clever and versatile way.

By annihilating a great part of American military manpower and war means, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have dealt *another telling blow at the U.S. will of aggression.*

Through the test of war *the U.S. expeditionary force has shown many fundamental weak points, and the L.A.F. many fundamental strong points.*

The strength of the adversary lies only in his big effectives, strong firepower support and great mobility. But numerical superiority does not automatically generate strength nor does this necessarily spring from a great mobility of troops with poor combativeness. So that, in practice, the enemy owes his strength essentially to his air force and artillery. But a strong firepower cannot make good basic weak points and prevent U.S.-puppet forces from being wiped out.

The U.S. expeditionary troops' fundamental weak points have revealed themselves and become more serious through the clash with the South Vietnamese armed forces and people : *a poor morale, an indifferent command, a deficient operational direction and execution.* The various U.S. technical arms and services have not been able to bring into full play their effectiveness in the Vietnamese theatre: U.S. passive and half-baked tactics have been incapable of matching the offensive and creative tactics of the L.A.F.. A salient feature is that *U.S. infantry has grown still weaker* in spite of organizational, tactical and technical efforts. *A.P.* (February 4, 1967) was right when remarking that U.S. infantry in Vietnam was only to support air force and artillery.

The enemy weak points are precisely there where lie the L.A.F. fundamental strong points. Having no air force and possessed of a weaker

artillery, i.e. firepower support, *they are strongly determined to annihilate their opponent, have high fighting spirit, constantly neutralize his strong points, aggravate his weak points to annihilate his troops.* Fighting on their own land, with the co-operation of their people, they are accustomed to the climate and familiar with the terrain. Promoting to the utmost their initiative, valiant and skilful, they patiently develop the best methods of fighting of their own, creatively applying various combat forms and tactics of people's war. No wonder that the longer they fight, the stronger they grow and the bigger successes they score in spite of U.S. superiority in manpower and weapons.

It is safe to say that, *in quality, the L.A.F. is unquestionably superior to their opponent.* On the battlefield, the number of troops is very important, but their quality constitutes the most decisive factor. Reality has proved that the L.A.F. are fully able to neutralize their adversary's numerical superiority with their high combativeness to face and defeat big forces with smaller ones. With such combativeness and clever use of revolutionary and scientific fighting methods, they have turned their enemy's "big effectives" into a "small force", his "strength" into "weakness". With it, they have made good their own numerical inferiority, increased their strength, constantly fostering and maintaining both their strong combat and operational position to knock down adverse troops.

III — Smashing the U.S. plan to achieve “rural pacification”, win over the population and occupy territory, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have maintained, consolidated and constantly expanded the liberated areas.

Pursuing their “limited war” of aggression against South Vietnam, now that the American imperialists have been inflicted heavy defeats in their “search and destroy” scheme, they will incur still heavier setbacks in their “rural pacification” program. *A.P.* correspondent Peter Arnett admitted on January 8, 1967 that: “Rural pacification” is a strategic objective of the United States in South Vietnam. It is aimed at countering the South Vietnam revolution in all fields and “rooting out” the guerilla war to win over the population and occupy land. Johnson called it the “second front”, a “counter-guerilla war” and “part of a mutually complementary strategy” worked out by himself to win the aggressive war in South Vietnam.

Alongside large-scale “search and destroy” operations, the enemy conducted hundreds of nibbling raids in many places, fiercely attacked the liberated areas under the control of the N.F.L., applying the savage “kill all, burn all and destroy all” policy. In addition to the big military forces composed of puppet, American and satellite troops, they have also thrown tens of thousands of cruel agents called “pacification cadres” into bloody actions and spent more than half a billion dollars on such demagogic shows as the

“development of education and public health” in the “rural construction” program.

However, under the banner of the N.F.L. the Southern armed forces and people have seen through the enemy's perfidious scheme and regarded the smashing of his “pacification” plans and the defence and consolidation of the liberated areas as a fundamental strategic task both in the political and military fields to frustrate the aggressive war of the American imperialists. That is why they have united like one man, accepted sacrifices and losses, made strenuous efforts in a persevering, continuous and extremely heroic struggle, combining military and political struggle and attacking the enemy by three ways — military operations, political actions and persuasion work among adverse troops. They have been determined to preserve the territory under their control, to defend their compatriots, foil the enemy's most barbarous raids, lay bare all his moves designed to deceive and corrupt people, and thus to smash his “pacification” plan.

The results fell short of the enemy's expectations:

1. The adversary could neither occupy more land nor win over more people; the liberated zones have been not only maintained and consolidated but also expanded with hundreds of thousands of people liberated from his grip.

2. The remaining “strategic hamlets” have become “rotten” and subject to frequent harassment. Meanwhile, the system of “fighting villages” developed vigorously, serving as the nucleus for the constant

development of the guerilla warfare in widely different areas.

3. The enemy could not re-establish the disintegrating puppet administrative machinery at the grass-root level even in the areas regarded by them as having been "pacified"; all his attempts at enticement and bribery were laid bare and opposed.

4. The "civil guards" and "pacification cadres" were wiped out and disintegrated by whole groups. Moreover, a substantial part of the American, puppet and satellite forces have been pinned down in the "pacification" campaign and suffered heavy losses in their nibbling operations.

5. The enemy wants to restrain and suppress guerilla warfare but it has developed ceaselessly and more strongly than ever, his "pacification" plans have been foiled by the high tide of the guerilla warfare combined with political struggle.

This is not only a heavy political failure but also a very bitter military setback of the U.S. imperialists; clearly, the "pacification" and "anti-pacification" fronts constitute a very basic weak point of the enemy and a very basic strong point of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people on both the political and the military fields.

Owing to their reactionary nature and the unjust character of their aggressive war in opposition to the high political prestige and strength as well as the military strength of the South Vietnam revolution, and because of their defensive and desperate strategic position following the fiasco of their "special

warfare", the American imperialists failed to materialize their intentions and plans for occupying more territory by nibbling attacks, winning over more people, restoring the rotten puppet administration, building and consolidating their on-the-spot rear areas in view of their war of aggression in South Vietnam. In dealing with the enemy's "pacification" scheme the Southern armed forces and people have sufficient conditions to promote the superiority and fundamental strong points—both military and political — of people's war, co-ordinate military with political actions and persuasion work, closely combine the efforts of the people, the armed forces and revolutionary cadres, co-ordinate and bring into full play all the three categories of armed forces, especially the regionals and the guerillas, and tightly co-ordinate large-unit operations with guerilla activities, paying particular attention to the latter. It is during their actions against the enemy's "pacification" plan that the guerillas, regionals and regulars *have wiped out an important part of American and puppet forces*, and developed guerilla warfare which served as the basis for big-scale attacks in the plains of Trungbo from the 17th Parallel southward, the Mekong delta and other places.

Heavily battered the American imperialists made a mistake in assigning the weakening puppet regular forces the "pacification" task. They pitted their weakest points against the people's strongest points. Together with the failure of all "pacification" plans the disintegration and eventual collapse of the puppet forces in the abyss of the "pacification" program is

a foregone conclusion. And the success of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people on this plane will also help them win greater military successes on the battlefield.

IV — In conjunction with North Vietnam to frustrate the U.S. war of destruction here, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have increased their efforts at concerted actions on the Northern and Southern theatres and, together with it, driven the aggressors into an ever more difficult situation.

In a hope to save their aggressive war now becoming a quagmire beset with ever greater defeats, and to isolate then stamp out the South Vietnamese people's revolutionary war, the U.S. imperialists have launched and continue expanding their war of destruction against North Vietnam as part and parcel of their overall predatory strategy in South Vietnam. But *over the past two years this war has been countered by the armed forces and population of North Vietnam in their people's war which has recorded tremendous successes, namely :*

1. The U.S. imperialists have failed in their basic objective to shake the Vietnamese people's determination, undermine North Vietnam's economic and national defence potentials, isolate South Vietnam and bolster up the sagging morale of the puppet army and administration.

The more it fights, the stronger North Vietnam becomes, the more South Vietnam fights, the greater its

victories. Meanwhile, the morale of the puppet army and administration keeps sinking.

2. The Americans have lost an important part of their air force — aircraft and pilots. The U.S. "air supremacy" has been debunked.

3. The U.S. imperialists have been driven into a greater strategic stalemate and greater political isolation in their own country and in the world: the anti-war movement has developed among the American people, contradictions are further exasperated among the U.S. ruling circles, the U.S. strategy and tactics are in an impasse.

To foil the fundamental goals of the U.S. war of destruction, the Southern armed forces and people have contributed a very active and important part.

While the Northern armymen and people overcome all difficulties in production and fighting to build and defend the socialist North and actively support the revolutionary forces for the liberation of the South, the Southern armed forces and people also remove all obstacles in fighting and construction, never cease to grow up and intensify their struggle. At the same time as they attack American ground forces, puppet and satellite troops on all battlefields, and stage accurate and powerful blows at U.S. airfields, gasoline depots, ammunition storages and billets of U.S. pilots and technicians, the Southern armed forces and people have annihilated and decimated a sizable part of the U.S. air force and closely co-ordinated their actions with the Northern theatre, determined to make the enemy repay ten times his blows at the North

Far from being isolated and weakened, the South has grown up, fought well and recorded great successes: that is a big failure for the Americans in their war of destruction against the North of our country.

The United States strategic aim of carrying out a war of destruction in the North to retrieve its losses in the South, of using its air force to win the war, is utterly erroneous. Its hope of preventing the North to support the South, of isolating the revolution in the South, is sheer illusion. As *Le Figaro* (January 1966) rightly pointed out "since the United States dropped its first bomb on North Vietnam, it has in fact welded the whole country into an unbreakable bloc". The Southern armed forces and people keep hitting hard and scoring major successes in all theatres of operations whatever the enemy does to strike at the North, shell it from warships off the coast and with artillery based in the South, or drop mines into rivers and canals or make any other escalation step. People's war in both zones of our country is perfectly capable of having the better of the American imperialists' modern ground, air and naval forces now invading our fatherland.

Therefore, owing to its setbacks in North and South Vietnam, the over-all strategic position of the U.S. aggressors is worse than ever before while ours in both zones of the country, thanks to our successes on all battlefields, is becoming continually steadier

PART II

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE WILL CERTAINLY DEFEAT THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS

Thus, by smashing one after another the strategic plans of the U.S. imperialists, wiping out an important part of the American, puppet and satellite forces, and of their war means, by crushing all U.S. "pacification" programs and contributing to foil the U.S. war of destruction against the North, *the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have dealt a heavy blow at the U.S. counter-offensive strategy, won the first round of their "limited" war of aggression and scored big military successes.*

The above-cited successes have given us more practical bases to assert once again that *to defeat the U.S. imperialists in the military field, the armed forces and people of South Vietnam must and can create a certain military strength, and secure a stronger military position than the enemy's by:*

1 — Relying on the absolute political superiority of our just war and the all-sided strength of our coun-

try due to favourable climatic, terrain and human conditions, and to the great support of the world peoples for our liberation war waged for our self-defence in our own country. This is the fundamental objective factor which creates military strength and superiority.

2 — Relying on correct political and military lines and the correct conduct of the war. This is the decisive subjective factor generating military strength and military superiority.

3 — Relying on the strength of the militant solidarity of our entire people who dispose of three categories of armed forces. These are in suitable number and of high quality. The armed forces form the backbone of military strength and the direct basis of military superiority.

4 — Using people's war as a fundamental form of struggle to defeat the U.S. aggressors. This is the only correct and effective means to turn the latent, varied capabilities of the just self-defence war into military strength and military superiority so as to vanquish the U.S. imperialists in any circumstances.

Together with great military successes, people's war in South Vietnam has scored big gains on the political plane, with the former paving the way for the latter. The South Vietnamese armed forces and people uphold a just cause, possess a strong force and are being the victor. Fighting an unjust war the American imperialists are the aggressor and find themselves in a losing position. That is why our entire people's single-mindedness, determination and confidence in their ultimate victory are strengthened with

every passing day. The struggle of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people under the banner of the National Front for Liberation is enjoying growing sympathy and support from the forces of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism throughout the world. Inversely, the enemy's political situation is in an increasing mess: the puppet administration is plagued with endless crises, the puppet army continues disintegrating while the contradictions between the Americans and the puppet deepen, those between the Americans and their satellites develop, and the U.S. warmongers politically become more and more isolated at home and abroad.

Thus, *the successes of people's war in South Vietnam are major ones, in both the political and the military fields, in both strategy and tactics.* They consecrate the triumph of firm and correct political and military lines, the triumph of the clever and creative conduct of the war and of people's war military art. They also reflect the grim determination to fight and the latent forces of our entire people who, in addition, benefit by the active support and assistance of the fraternal socialist countries and our friends over the world.

Those successes, especially in the military sphere, bespeak the military and political might of people's war; they mark a new development of people's war in the South which, after thwarting "special warfare", has won the first round of the "limited war" of the American imperialists and their stooges in every aspect. They lay bare the limitations and fundamental weak points of the U.S. aggressive war on both the

military and the political planes. It is in the fierce confrontation between our people and the aggressor, particularly in the past two years or so that we have come to know our enemy and ourselves more deeply and more comprehensively.

Obviously, *the U.S. imperialists, strength is of a material and technical nature.* They have a big economic and national defence potential, a numerous army with high mobility and a strong firepower, especially that of the air force.

All American schemes and strategic and tactical plans in this war of aggression against Vietnam are based on this point. That is why our people's struggle is a very arduous one. But in our country, *the strength of the United States has a limit.* It cannot be brought into full play due to U.S. political weaknesses, the terrain conditions and our people's war combat methods.

Less than two years after the American imperialists started their "limited war" of aggression, many personages in the U.S. political circles have already complained that the war burden is heavily weighing on the U.S. economy and the American people's life, that it is dealing a mortal blow at Johnson's so-called "great society" program. The U.S. imperialists have themselves admitted that they are not in a position to spend as much money as they want on the war nor to prolong it indefinitely.

Moreover, *the enemy's weak points are fundamental, on both the political and the military planes.* They spell out his doom in strategy and tactics, in "search and

destroy" and "pacification" tasks, in his "limited war" of aggression in the South as well as his war of destruction in the North. The prestige of the U.S. trump cards — infantry, air force and navy — have been debunked in the eyes of our and the world peoples. Ballyhoo about the United States unimaginable military might has gone bankrupt with the fiasco of its aggression against a small country as ours.

This is particularly true of the U.S. conduct of the war :

1. They have been conducting the war in a passive way, without consistency in strategy. Defeated in their "special warfare" strategy, they have had to switch to that of a "limited war" and wage a war of destruction against North Vietnam, but the more they "escalate", the heavier their setbacks become in both zones of Vietnam, and the more they increase their troops, the deeper they are bogged down. They want to fight rapidly to snatch a quick victory, but they are compelled to fight a protracted war.

Disunity has been widening in the ranks of the U.S. ruling circles, with some advocating withdrawal, others urging stronger actions, others again wavering, not willing to lose the war and fearing at the same time that it may broaden and drag on. Politically, the United States cannot fully use its military strength and, moreover, is sustaining more and more bitter defeats. This explains why it is faced with a graver political crisis and more serious political isolation.

2. Out of self-complacency the United States relies on its economic and military potential, and

underestimates the moral and material strength of the Vietnamese people.

It hopes that by boosting its effectives and using more bombs and bullets it can intimidate our people in both the North and the South, and change the balance of forces in its favour, thus creating a basis for its counter-offensive strategy. But the balance of forces has changed contrarily to the U.S. wishful thinking. So, the more the Americans "escalate" the war in North Vietnam, the deeper they are bogged down. On the South Vietnamese theatre their counter-offensive strategy, which did not take into account the practical relation of strength, has become an adventurous one, doomed to failure. After each setback they cannot find where their mistake lies, but obstinately ascribe it to the lack of troops, and military equipment, and then commit bigger mistakes and sustain still more bitter defeats.

3. The U.S. strategy is a passive one, vacillating between offensive and defensive, between increasing the mobility of troops and using them as an occupation force. It has to cope with people's war in South Vietnam on many theatres of operations, from the 17th Parallel to the point of Camau, in the jungles, in the plains as well as in the towns and cities, both at the front and in the rear. The immediate rear of the Americans, the staging base for their counter-offensive, is unstable and being narrowed down. In fact, there is no place in South Vietnam that they can regard as their sanctuary. Their logistic and operational bases, their airfields, are frequently hit though heavily guarded.

Their communications and transport are under constant harassment. The American press estimates that on the average the United States suffers 100 casualties without being able to secure one kilometre of safe road. Attacked in all parts of South Vietnam, it has to fall back to the defensive although it wants to take the offensive. It has substantially increased its effectiveness, yet its mobile forces are still insufficient, support units swell rapidly while fighting units remain inadequate. For their part, the puppet troops, who can assume neither combat nor defence tasks, are assigned the "pacification" job, which can only accelerate their disintegration.

4. In operational conduct as well as in fighting the Americans proceed from the point of view that everything is decided by firepower. They repose no confidence in the effectiveness of their infantry, which, in fact, is too faint-hearted and too weak to engage the L.A.F., without firepower support, let alone annihilate them. They work out imposing plans but their possibilities to put them into effect are limited. Their firepower is strong when it is used from long distances, but the support which it actually gives to the infantry is also limited. Though commanding a great operational mobility in tactical and combat jobs, the U.S. infantry usually huddles together in one place, not daring to fan out. As a result, this mobility only tires out their troops and makes their operations more costly. American planes, guns and tanks possess a big strike force, but they are greatly handicapped by the infantry (shock force) which is weak, and in some cases, even nil.

Clearly, the U.S. ground forces cannot destroy the L.A.F. because their infantry has a low morale, is weak and trained to fight on battlefields with clear-cut frontlines, and their other services are incapable of great effectiveness. When fielded, American troops can form encirclement prongs rather quickly; however, as their infantry lacks combativeness such a mobile deployment simply scatters their forces to be destroyed by chunks. In attacks, assaults and pursuits, they essentially count on the firepower of their air force and artillery, so that their "search and destroy" efforts prove futile. Instead, they are often intercepted and suffer heavy losses in men and *matériel* at the hands of the Liberation forces who turn up unexpectedly. In the direction of their predatory war against a small country like Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists are facing the following unsurmountable difficulties and deadlock in the political, strategic and tactical fields:

- They cannot stabilize the puppet administration as a political prop for their aggressive war;

- They cannot consolidate the puppet army as their political and military mainstay;

- They cannot decide as to how many more G.I.'s should be sent to South Vietnam;

- They cannot extricate themselves from their worsening strategic position;

- They do not know how to end the war without losing face or how long to carry it on;

- They cannot bolster up the morale of the American, puppet and satellite troops. About this *Newsweek*

(Feb. 6, 1967) wrote, "the U.S. morale is deep into slush";

- They cannot save the American, puppet and satellite troops from annihilation, their logistic bases from attacks and their communication lines from being cut off;

- They cannot solve their tactical problems, remedy the weak point of the U.S. expeditionary force—their infantry—so as to wipe out the L.A.F.;

- They cannot "pacify" the countryside;

- They do not know how to attack North Vietnam in order to limit, let alone prevent, its support to South Vietnam, nor how to get rid of their political isolation at home and abroad;

They cannot deceive the Vietnamese and world peoples about their "peace goodwill" and their offer for "unconditional negotiations".

As the *Los Angeles Times* of December 9, 1966 has admitted, powerful America turns out to be the victim of an ill-conducted war, and is becoming the laughing-stock in the eyes of the strategists throughout the world.

True, in the words of the *Christian Science Monitor* (January 19, 1967) the American imperialists have engaged in an awkward war that President Johnson himself does not understand. From a subjective point of view, how can the United States conduct the war to escape defeat, let alone win the war? No wonder that this paper has also acknowledged, though reservedly, that the war does not fare very well and there is no sign of a better course.

The enemy's foibles lie precisely there where our fortes are. Together with their military and political strong points inherent in a just self-defence war for liberation, waged on their native land, *the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have another truly fundamental one—their own strivings both in the direction of the war and in the execution of the war plans.*

1. They are endowed with a *determination of a strategic character* to fight for independence and freedom till complete victory. This is also the determination of our entire people. Theirs is a correct strategy, an offensive strategy, one of resolute and uninterrupted attacks, which has been developed day after day. When the United States massively sent its expeditionary troops to South Vietnam, thus switching from "special warfare" to a "limited war", the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, far from being scared by the U.S. outward military might, far from vacillating and falling back to a defensive position or attrition warfare, *continued to apply their offensive strategy, that of resolute and uninterrupted attacks*, and furthered this strong position on all theatres. This determination stemmed from *the correct, scientific assessment of the relation of forces between the enemy and us, in accordance with our resolute and thoroughly revolutionary class stand.* It was the expression of our people's aspirations, will and mettle in face of the U.S. direct aggression, and correctly reflected the respective positions and strength of our people and the enemy at that time, as well as the law of revolution and revolutionary war in South Vietnam which consists in

developing the struggle from political offensives to ever-stronger military and political offensives.

This determination has enabled the South Vietnam L.A.F. to mobilize and organize all the latent forces of the masses, to maintain their initiative of action, their strong and winning position, in the fight against the "special warfare" and now against the "limited war" despite the continuous build-up, the introduction of a huge *matériel* and technical forces and repeated counter-offensives of the U.S. aggressors. This determination has a decisive effect on the successes in every field over the recent past, just as on the trend of the development of the war — the inevitable defeat of the U.S. aggressors and the certain victory of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people.

2. The L.A.F. and people have built up an ever-broadening and more experienced *people's armed force* composed of three categories in appropriate number and with high quality. Rationally fielded on all theatres this armed force has created a powerful people's war battle-array with regular troops attacking the enemy without let-up everywhere, encircling him tightly as in an iron net. Like a beast held at bay he is struggling furiously, but the more he wriggles the more firmly he is caught in the net.

3. The South Vietnamese armed forces and people have worked out and creatively put into effect *wonderful people's war combat methods*, such as combining armed struggle with political struggle, co-ordinating large-unit offensives with guerilla warfare and attacks on the adversary's rear bases and communication lines.

Relying on the strength of their revolutionary spirit and their resourcefulness, the L.A.F. have made full use of all weapons and other war means at their disposal, promoted close-range fighting, managed to limit the effectiveness of the enemy's strong firepower, and made their shock troops the decisive force to win victory. That is why, they have scored more and more successes in wiping out American, puppet and satellite troops, in striking at their bases and war means, in defending and liberating the population, in safeguarding and enlarging the liberated zones, in narrowing down the occupied areas, in making deep thrusts into the enemy's rear, and in maintaining and developing the initiative of action on all theatres of operations.

4. With their perfectly correct political line, the South Vietnamese armed forces and people have won *ever more active and broader support from the socialist countries, the working class and international communist movement, the national-liberation movement and the peace-freedom- and justice-loving people throughout the world.*

Clearly enough, while the American imperialists are passively sliding instead of firmly advancing in the war, as the *Washington Post* of December 28, 1966 wrote, without seeing the light at the end of the "tunnel", the South Vietnamese armed forces and people are making ever-steadier steps with the bearing of the victor, forging ahead on the correct path they have chosen to attain their goal.

The military successes of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people over the recent past have paved the way for forth-coming greater ones. Keeping

clear from subjectivism, self-complacency, fear of hardships and sacrifices, and guarding against illusion in a *Pax Americana*, they fully understand that only by fighting resolutely, destroying many more U.S. troops and war means, wiping out many more puppet troops and disintegrating the Saigon army, can they smash the will of aggression of the American imperialists.

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Despite their bitter failures, the U.S. imperialists remain incurable braggarts. On the one hand, they admit that they are not in a position to win but on the other, they claim they cannot lose. Thus, the question is whether they will be defeated by our people militarily.

The military victories of people's war in South Vietnam and throughout our country have made it unmistakably clear that in Vietnam the U.S. imperialists have suffered heavy military defeats and that they will sustain complete failure. This is a reality of historical significance which contributes to demonstrate a truth of our time: in the conditions of to-days's world, a small people, determined to rise up and closely united, fearing no sacrifice, having a correct political and military line, and knowing how to wage people's war and win broad international support, are fully able to defeat militarily the enemy number one of mankind — U.S. imperialism—which is wielding the biggest economic and military potential in the capitalist world.

MAJOR SUCCESSES OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE IN WINTER 1966 AND SPRING 1967

A. ENEMY RAIDS HEAVILY BEATEN OFF

Time	Theatres of operations	Result
October 18, 1966	Rachgia	Nearly 1 puppet regiment wiped out at Goquao.
November 1966	Tayninh	Operation <i>Attleboro</i> foiled: more than 3,000 enemy troops knocked down, U.S. 196th Infantry Brigade put of action.
November 1966	Gialai (Western plateau)	Operation <i>Paul Revere IV</i> in Pleijrang area crushed: 2 U.S. battalions, 8 U.S. companies and 5 puppet companies destroyed.
November 6, 1966	Quangnam	1 puppet battalion annihilated at Tamky.
December 12, 1966	Mytho	1 puppet battalion knocked out at Cailay.
December 17, 1966	Binh Dinh	1 U.S. battalion and 2 U.S. companies wiped out at Locgiang.

January 1967	Thudaumot	Operation <i>Cedar Falls</i> smashed: more than 3,200 enemy troops knocked down, over 200 vehicles mostly armoured cars destroyed.
January 19, 1967	Travinh	1 puppet battalion annihilated.
January 26, 1967	Quangnam	1 battalion and 2 companies of G.I.'s knocked out.
February 8, 1967	Longan	1 puppet battalion wiped out.
February 9-17, 1967	Binhdin	An American operation foiled, nearly 1,000 enemy troops put out of action, 75 aircraft destroyed.
February 10-25, 1967	Tayninh	Operation <i>Gadsden</i> frustrated: more than 1,300 enemy troops knocked out.
February 17-March 19, 1967	Binhthuan	637 G.I.'s and puppets knocked down.
February 19, 1967	Quangngai	Operation "Lien Ket 81" crushed: 2 puppet battalions badly mauled in West Sontinh.
February 22-25, 1967	Lamdong	4 U.S.-puppet battalions knocked out, 10 aircraft downed.
February 22, 1967	Darlac	1 puppet battalion "gone back to the drawing boards".
February 26-March 10, 1967	Quangtri	2,730 G.I.'s knocked down, 20 armoured cars destroyed.
March 6, 1967	Binhdin	500 Americans wiped out at Myduc.

February 22-April 10, 1967	Tayninh	Operation <i>Junction City</i> shattered: more than 11,000 enemy troops knocked down (including 5 infantry battalions, 6 armoured squadrons annihilated), over 900 vehicles destroyed (among which over 700 armoured cars), 143 aircraft downed and set afire, nearly 100 artillery pieces destroyed.
March 21, 1967	Bienhoa	1 puppet battalion annihilated at Xuanloc.
March 19, 1967	Thudaumot	1 U.S. combat team annihilated at Baubang (See Operation <i>Junction City</i>).
February 15-March 31, 1967	Western Plateau (Gialai)	More than 4,000 enemy troops knocked out, including 9 U.S. companies and 6 puppet companies.
April 4-6, 1967	Binhdin	Over 900 enemy troops annihilated, among them 700 Yankees.

B. ENEMY COMMUNICATION LINES HARD HIT

March 23, 1967	Hamluong River (Bentre)	8 ships set afire or sunk, more than 1,000 enemy troops knocked out.
March 24, 1967	Highway No 1 (Quangnam)	Over 200 vehicles (including 1 armoured squadron) wiped out, more than 350 enemy troops knocked down.
April 1st, 1967	Ducpho (Quangngai)	3 ships set afire, more than one hundred American troops wiped out.

October 1966- May 1967	Longtau River (Baria)	Over 30 engagements fought, 20 ships sunk, many others damaged, more than one thousand enemy troops knocked down.
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C. ENEMY POSITIONS AND TOWNS STRONGLY ATTACKED

December 10, 1966	(Anlo Thuathien)	1 battalion, 1 company and 4 platoons of the pup- pets annihilated.
December 19, 1967	Vankiep (Baria)	4 puppet companies killed and captured.
December 13, 1966	Quangtin (Quangnam)	1 puppet battalion anni- hilated.
December 27, 1966	Xuanson (Binhdin)	1 infantry battalion and 1 artillery battalion of G.I.'s knocked down.
January 16, 1967	Chauhung (Bentre)	1 battalion and 1 company of the puppets annihi- lated.
January 16, 1967	Cangiuoc (Longan)	1 puppet battalion anni- hilated.
February 1967	Quangdien (Thuathien)	More than 300 puppet troops wiped out, many cruel agents punished.
February 15, 1967	Quangthanh (Quangngai)	1 Pak Jung Hi battalion knocked down almost completely.
March 6, 1967	Hill 241 (Quangtri)	Over 1,500 G.I.'s knocked out, scores of artillery pieces blast down.
March 6, 1967	Duchoa (Cholon)	1 puppet battalion anni- hilated.

March 15, 1967	Dongdu (Giadinh)	Artillery attack: more than 300 G.I.'s wiped out, 10 aircraft and 36 military vehicles destroyed.
April 6, 1967	Tuha, Lavang (Quangtri)	Nearly 1,700 enemy troops wiped out, 200 vehicles and 10 artillery pieces blast down.
November 1st, 1966	Saigon	Artillery attack on the puppet parade site: 250 Americans, puppets and satellites knocked out.
December 26, 1966	Puppet logistic base in Hue	Over 100 military vehicles, the battalion command staff and 1 transport company destroyed.
February 6, 1967	Namgiao shooting- range	More than 100 enemy troops knocked down, over 50 military vehicles destroyed.
March 17, 1967	Quangngai town Longbinh (Bienhoa)	95 enemy troops wiped out. Four successive attacks: more than 1,200,000 artillery shells and rockets destroyed, nearly 500 G.I.'s knocked out.
January 16, and April 2nd, 1967	Suoiram (Bienhoa)	Two fierce attacks: over 340 armoured cars and more than 1,150 G.I.'s knocked down.

D. AIRFIELDS FIERCELY AND REPEATEDLY STRUCK

Tanssonhat : Two strikes: nearly 260 aircraft destroyed, 630 G.I.'s and puppets knocked out.

Pleiku	: 92 aircraft destroyed, 280 G.I.'s wiped out, 50,000 litres of gasoline burnt, 5 arms depots blast down.
Danang	: Three strikes : more than 110 aircraft destroyed, nearly 2,000 G.I.'s wiped out.
Duchoa (Longan)	: Two strikes : 10 aircraft destroyed, over one hundred enemy troops knocked out.
Dautieng	: Three strikes : 41 aircraft destroyed, nearly 60 G.I.'s knocked down.
Phuloi	: Two strikes : 35 aircraft destroyed, 375 enemy troops wiped out.
Soctrang	: 35 aircraft destroyed, nearly 300 enemy troops knocked down.
Deduc	: 50 aircraft destroyed, 350 enemy troops knocked out.
Tranoc	: 58 aircraft destroyed, more than 420 enemy troops knocked down.
Chulai	: 35 aircraft destroyed, over 200 G.I.'s and the radar station wiped out.
Camau	: 10 aircraft destroyed, 110 enemy troops knocked down, 3 military vehicles blast down.
Vinhlong (Cantho)	: 3 aircraft destroyed, 100 enemy troops knocked out.
Thuybinh (Cantho)	: 9 aircraft destroyed, many enemy troops knocked down.
Tanthanh (Bentre)	: 4 aircraft destroyed, 2 gasoline-depots burnt and more than 100 enemy troops wiped out.
Gohoi (Quangngai)	: 6 aircraft and 6 artillery pieces destroyed, 400 G.I.'s knocked down.
Ankhe	: 28 aircraft destroyed, 115 G.I.'s knocked out.

ERRATA

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Instead of</u>	<u>Please read</u>
13	2	<i>rarned</i> forces	armed forces
18 (<i>Footnote</i>)	1	180,000 Americans	108,000 Americans
41	20	to-days's world	to-day's world
45	12	December 19, 1967	December 19, 1966

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